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Introduction 
In exploring the role of the sensing body in the development of technological 
interfaces in the contemporary arts, it is useful to begin by examining how a body 
itself operates as a technological interface with its environment. From a Heideggerian 
perspective, the body can be said to be instrumental- ist in its dealings with the world, 
also representing the influence and threat that technological practices pose to lived 
experience and our experience of ‘the human’. The same can be said for the 
embodied techniques of dance improvisation practices. 
While dance performances from the Judson Dance Theatre period began to 
interrogate relationships between dancing bodies and objects (Burt 2012), a number 
of improvisation practices since the 1970s have continued to derive source material 
from non-human and organic images in ways that encourage a kinetic, non-stylized 
response. Simone Forti’s study of animal movements and interest in ‘an animism’ of 
non-human forms and textures (Hayes 1986: 11), and the environmentally responsive 
improvisation practices of Suprapto Suryodarma or Jennifer Monson are examples. 
Influential performance texts like Body, Space, Image (1993) and A Widening Field 
(2003) by Miranda Tufnell and Chris Crickmay encourage poetic ways of finding a 
somatically-informed, dialogic affinity with physical objects and places, using sensory 
encounters as starting points for creative work. 
David Abram’s Spell of the Sensuous (1997) similarly explains how an inherent 
human sensibility to understand the languages of non-human beings, identified 
through phenomenological processes, can activate a sense of kinship or connection 
with the biosphere. Comparably, practices of contact improvisation and Ki Aikido 
focus on the cultivation of awareness of relationships, with techniques for extending 
the perceptual acuity of a mover that are increasingly seen as being of value in a 
performer’s training. Here, the emerging discipline of postphenomenologyi offers a 
useful method to critique our relationship to corporeal technologies by questioning 
how relationships between people and things are mediated, rather than seeking to 
articulate reality solely through the context of human perception. 
By investigating the benefits of a postphenomenological analysis of dance 
improvisation practices, this article offers a variety of outlooks on the tacit 
technologies of corporeal movement performed in relation to another body. Outlined 
below, results of this investigation include recognition of three useful technologies: 
the (dancing) body itself as a motion-capture device, the potential of improvisation as 
a modality of imaging in relation to another, and a diversifying field of somatic 
practices as a way to investigate this potential. I propose that such practices can 
generate kinaesthetically and affectively charged knowledge through models of 
sensuous participation with an environment. 
 
Body as motion-capture device 
The increasing use of prosthetic technologies in the arts provokes dialogue around how the 
body can be understood to be more than itself. This issue is foregrounded, for example, in Erin 
Manning’s discussion of performances involving technologies that ‘extend’ the body, positing 
themselves somehow as ‘more than’ the body. In an attempt to articulate, in the company of 
Deleuze and Guattari, Derrida, Artaud, Hayle and others, how the body is always already more 
than a body, Manning claims that ‘new ecologies of experience’ are rarely created under the 
conditions of ‘technology-enhanced’ dance performance that engage with prosthetic or 
motion-capture technologies (2009: 63–64). She goes on to propose that the body becomes 
choreographed by the technologies that seek to enhance it, effectively limiting its capacities 
for evolution and surprise or ‘relational eventfulness’ (2009: 65). In the spirit of articulating 
the body’s ‘more-thanness’, Manning calls us to consider the original capacities of the body 
as a process of technogenesis: 
Technogenesis – ontogenesis of the bio-technological not as a technical additive to 
the biological but as an emphasis on originary technicity – suggests a working 
vocabulary. Here, the body is posited not as a stable category but as a creative vector 
of experiential space-time. Foregrounded is the body in movement: pure plastic 
rhythm. (2009: 66) 
 
Moving his or her body via various modes of visualization and intention, a dancer acts as 
technician of his or her own plastic soma; by-products of this practice represent altered ways 
of experiencing one’s extended environment. As Natasha Myers (2012) suggests in her 
sociological reading of the behaviours of life scientists, biologists who unconsciously develop 
embodied ways of animating the phenomena they research – for example, through gesture in 
an excited conversation about cell-bonding structures – similarly represent a particular kind of 
originary technicity, or vocabulary that expresses understanding about their subject matter. 
The performance-based improvisation work of a number of dance artists presents routes 
towards practicing more nuanced perceptions of body and world, and posits performing as the 
practical solution to sharing immediate, embodied discoveries. Deborah Hay’s daily practice 
of asking koan-type questions of her body, e.g. ‘what if now is here is harmony?’ while she 
performs her physical responses (2011), highlights movement as a performed response to the 
body’s perception of ‘now’, ‘here’ and ‘harmony’ for example. Hay’s mantra of ‘whole body 
the teacher’ (2005) grants authority to the language of movement produced from these 
questions. Similarly, Action Theatre teacher Sten Rudstrom employs training methods which 
include translating unmediated, visceral responses to organic images (e.g. mud, rocks, moss) 
into performance using a combined palette of voice and movement, prioritizing a cycle of 
sensing, feeling and action that draws on somatic responses to an imagined organism as source 
material for performance (2005). 
In a proposal that dance can also provide the starting point for an embodied analysis of 
biological phenomena, my own performance of Twig Dances (Sarco-Thomas 2010) employs 
a score in which the dancer seeks for translating into movement the perceived physical shape, 
growth patterns, texture, colours and anatomy of a plant, as he or she experiences them in that 
place and moment. As an observational practice of image translation, Twig Dances can be 
figured as a kind of motion-capture technology and a means by which to represent and 
understand observed or perceived biological phenomena. 
 Using the curling tendril of a sweet pea plant as impetus for a curved pathway of the arm, 
or the deeply scored ravines of oak bark as a pattern to enable the shoulders to rise and stretch 
away from the scapula, the dancer translates his sensuous observations immediately into 
imitative movement-sensations. By using Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception 
(1962) as a lynchpin between observation and experience, the score seeks to develop the 
performer’s physical and perceptual skill in making detailed, embodied, and – as far as possible 
– qualitatively accurate observations about individual plant specimens. 
By inviting an audience to witness a process of questioning the body as a perceptive tool, 
Hay, Rudstrom and myself use improvisation as an image- making technology. Hay invites the 
movements made by ‘the whole body as teacher’ (Hay 2005) to be seen as images by calling the 
score ‘performance practice’ and inviting imagined or real viewers into the space with her as she 
works (Daly in Hay 2000: xviii). In Rudstrom’s case, the artist starts from an imagined image 
and translates it through motion (Rudstrom 2005). In the case of Twig Dances, the living plant is 
perceived as it grows, often moving very little, with the dancer rendering various impressions of 
the plant’s anatomy as motion through performance. 
In this light, improvisational strategies can be seen as technologies to translate form and 
movement from many sources. As tools of translation, such technologies necessarily invite 
questions about the intentions and relations of the dancer to the image. As Manning writes, 
‘relational movement is always improvisational’ (2009: 31). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Pinus pinea Twig Dance by Malaika Sarco-Thomas in Dartington 
Gardens, 2010. 
  
 
 
Figure 2: Looking closely at Echinops ritro, Dartington Gardens, 2010. 
 
 
Figure 3: Echinops ritro Twig Dance, Dartington Gardens, 2010. 
 
Improvisation as a modality of imaging ‘in relation To’ 
Where used as a technology for observation and incorporating new knowledge, 
improvisation needs to function both as a research practice and as an object of study. 
According to the recently termed discipline of postphenomenological critique (see 
Hasse 2006; Ihde 1993, 2003; Verbeek 2005, 2006a, 2006b), any effort towards 
scientific research with the aid of perception-enhancing tools should rigorously 
question the technologies used to ‘mediate our experience of the world’ (Rosenberger 
2009: 66). Paul Rosenberger outlines a plan for a postphenomenological analysis of 
imaging technologies in neuroscience as a way of better understanding how our 
relationships with these technologies influence our perception and understanding of 
the world. If phenomenology seeks to identify reality through our experience of the 
world, then for the philosophy of technology, postphenomenology draws on 
pragmatism with a focus on 
 
• the relations between humans and the world 
• analysing the technologies which mediate our experience of the world [and] 
• identifying various specific ways the world is shaped by our experience of it 
through those technologies that make experience possible. (Rosenberger 2009: 
66) 
 
A similar approach can be useful in body-based practices that engage with 
phenomenological methods of research. Critical examination of observational 
capacities as articulated through the body, through equipment in the life sciences 
laboratory and through devices of motion-capture imaging, offers an opportunity to 
recognize the potential of all three kinds of instruments as means for comprehending 
and relating to biological processes. 
Starting from the premise that neuroscientific research relies on new technologies for 
developing images of moving, living matter, and that phenomenology as a discipline 
can benefit from the approach of pragmatism (through querying the importance of an 
object by explaining its impact on practice) Rosenberger suggests a three-step approach 
to analysing our practical engagement with imaging technologies: 
 
1. conceptualization of the disputed images [produced by technologies] as multi-
stable, 
2. identification of the competing variations [and] 
3. examination of the roles played by mediating technologies in the interpretive 
strategies which enable each variation. (2009: 67) 
 
This method could also be usefully applied to dance improvisation technologies, and 
highlights how, when developing any technologies, we become accountable for the 
changes they effect. 
This relates to points made by life scientists interviewed by sociologist 
Natasha Myers who notes that the problem of using visual imaging technologies to 
illustrate and explain phenomena in the life sciences is precisely that these tools freeze 
and flatten data that is dynamic and alive. Even animated simulations of processes 
often inappropriately impose specificity or presume directionality. In an interview with 
two scientists explaining the challenges of representing their research on ‘how proteins 
fold to acquire their active conformations in the cell’, one scientist expresses her concern 
that ‘[computer-based] rethinking ‘technobiopolitics’ and the technogenetic potential 
of the body through changing our perceptual relations to space and species. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Plantago major; an example of an image that becomes a score 
for a Twig Dance. 
 
 
 
Somatic response-ability: affectively charged knowledge 
This intention to apprehend the world more fully through one’s mind-body schema has 
clear implications for practices in somatics and performance. Though somatic 
practices are often identified as studies of first-person experiential research of the lived 
body, the necessary interaction with a physical and energetic environment provides 
the conditions to, in the words of the International Somatic Movement Education and 
Therapy Association, 
 
• Focus on the body both as an objective physical process and as a subjec- 
tive process of lived consciousness; [and] 
• Recognize habitual patterns of perceptual, postural and movement inter- 
action with one’s environment. (ISMETA 2003 in Eddy 2009) 
 
Projects that seek to unpack processes of lived consciousness and recognition of 
patterns of interaction with one’s environment also hold promise for rethinking our 
means of psychic engagement with objects and place. Highlighting our capacity for 
responsive intelligence, somatic experiences of kinaesthetic empathy found through 
‘excitable tissues’ in the dancer or performer, can bring about recognition of the 
body’s inherent potential to sense and describe qualities in multiple non-human others. 
As theatrical or performative means of presenting research is becoming more widely 
recognized and practiced (White and Belliveau 2010), it makes sense to ask how and 
where somatic research can effectively be disseminated. Improvisation can be seen as 
a means of presenting first-person perception as research, both formally (as a 
performance score) and informally (as the gesticulating scientist inadvertently ‘dances’ 
while explaining a phenomena). 
In her recent article ‘Dance your PhD, embodied animations, body experiments 
and the affective entanglements of life science research’ Natatsha Myers argues that ‘the 
Dance Your PhD contests, as well as other performative modalities, can expand and 
extend what it is possible for scientific researchers to see, say, imagine and feel’ (2012). 
In analysing the unselfconscious gestures of biologists, Myers suggests that the impulse 
to embody one’s experience of a studied subject is a frequent by-product of research, 
and exposes a relationship of embodied ‘withness’ between a researcher and a 
phenomenon. 
In relation to machine-based methods of scientific image-making, which have their 
shortcomings for capturing and representing life processes, Myers proposes that 
researchers who become enmeshed in the processes of their analysis develop a new 
way of embodied knowing: 
 
A gestalt shift makes it possible to see that it is not so much the phenomena 
that are caught, but the scientists themselves: they are the ones arduously 
entraining their bodies, imaginations and instruments to the rhythms of 
phenomena they desire to know. Indeed, practitioners can be seen hitching 
rides on and being pulled in by the phenomena they struggle to 
comprehend. This shift to a language of ‘hitching onto’ and ‘getting caught 
by’ signals researchers’ capacities to move with and be moved by the 
phenomena that they attempt to draw into view. 
(2012: 177, original emphasis) 
 
Described here is a process whereby scientists – or potentially dancers – 
who are intimately involved in witnessing a subject, become imperceptibly 
drawn into the act of observation to the point that they incorporate the 
phenomena into their bodily experience. Hands, arms and legs become 
‘excitable tissues’, ready to become involved in interpreting the phenomena 
of study. In the same way that a dancer both moves with and becomes 
moved by the phenomena of a performance-based or choreographic task, a 
scientific researcher’s improvised body-work constitutes an essential way 
of knowing his or her subject. 
Myers writes, ‘by becoming proxies for a process, researchers can 
emulate a phenomenon in ways that generate kinaesthetically and 
affectively charged knowledge. A model or animation is thus not only a 
representation, but also a performative form of knowing’ (2012: 172), and 
contributes to a diversified field of technologies which could include what 
she calls the body’s ‘fleshy antennae’. Myers calls for valuation of the 
knowledge produced by embodied animation, writing that ‘theories of 
representation and communication in science must be reconfigured in 
order to account for the role of embodied animations in the production and 
propagation of scientific knowledge’ (2012: 177). 
Recent attention to mirror neurons and kinaesthetic empathy offer other 
models for explaining this kind of affectively charged, performative form 
of knowing. Highlighting this capacity for responsive intelligence in the 
body can bring about individual agency and recognition of the body’s 
inherent potential as a motion-capture technology operable in real-time. 
Everyday scenarios of copying a dance instructor, gesticulating to describe a 
great sports moment, or performing comic impersonations draw on basic 
skills of imaging in motion. So-called somatic practices, which focus on 
responsiveness through sensory perception, encourage embodied first-
person engagement with object and place and can offer a more focused 
opportunity to see the potential of imitation to enable affective, empathic 
participation with a larger sensuous environment. 
Tapping into sensory images of the non-human may be seen to be part of 
a number of Postmodern and New Dance practices since the 1970s. In more 
abstract examples, Steve Paxton has spoken about taking care of the body 
as ‘your animal’ (cited in Morrissey 2011), and Mary O’Donnell Fulkerson 
has invited students to map image-sensations of moss, stones, and fur onto 
the spine (1977). As Ramsay Burt (2012) has pointed out, a sense of 
response- ability or a ‘withness’ to non-human objects can be found in the 
work of the Judson Dance Theatre. Performances such as David Gordon’s 
Chairs (1974) and Yvonne Rainer’s Terrain (1963), can be seen as 
performances with objects in which a dancer develops a duet with a chair 
as the second performer, for example, as in the case of Chairs. As Burt 
suggests, this can be said to introduce a sense of the body as object-like, 
and likewise, open up potentials for seeing objects as body-like. In both 
cases, the dance performance becomes ‘technogenetic’ to cite Manning, 
recomposing the potential of bodies for audience and performer: 
This coming-into-emergence is a technogenetic experience. It is 
technogenetic because it recomposes the body. This recomposition takes 
form through a multiplicity of techniques. For Simondon (1969), a 
technique is a technology of emergence (an ontogenetic technology or 
technogenesis) through which new complex systems are composed. These 
techniques can be thought as associated milieus of potential. Associated 
milieus are ecologies that emerge through the very technogenesis that 
gives them form. (2009: 71) 
 
The potential for such practices to highlight our capacity for reading a multitude of 
images – foreign objects, textures, organisms and processes – should not be 
underestimated. According to Manning, this is possible through the ‘machinic body’, 
the body provoked ‘to become in excess of its organism’, to become more than we 
think it already is. Bodies engaging with these techniques ‘become experiments in the 
making’ (Manning 2009: 71). This experimenting body could be seen as the world’s 
most exciting book – the catalogue of an infinite array of movement languages as read 
through the improvising technologist-performer. 
 
Conclusion: a post-human book of motion 
Through ‘reading the world’, an improviser proposes new ways of relating to other bodies and 
reveals the potential of dance as a translational process. The bobbing of the ripe plantain head 
on its stalk, as ‘tried out’ by the improvising dancer, becomes a route towards sensing the 
turgidity of one’s own thoracic vertebrae and seeking to experience the qualities of bounce 
revealed in the other. Performing this bounce, the dancer takes responsibility as image-maker, 
translator, operator of technology and mediator of data. For the dancer or somatic practitioner, 
translation practices, rigorously used, can challenge and alert us to the thrill and intelligence of 
the act of perception. The translating body becomes a post-human book of motion. 
Dramaturg and writer David Williams describes how the idea of ‘a book of motion’ 
influenced him in his early days as a performance maker. In responding to the question put 
forward by Theatre, Dance and Performance Training journal, ‘What book or books have made 
a significant impact on your thinking about or conduct of your training and why?’, he refers to 
an imaginary text called A Book of Motion that is depicted in Peter Greenaway’s film Prospero’s 
Books. According to the film, 
This is a book that at the most simple level describes how birds fly and waves roll, 
how clouds form and apples fall from trees. It describes how the eye changes its shape 
when looking at great distances, how hairs grow in a beard, why the heart flutters and 
the lungs inflate involuntarily and how laughter changes the face. At its most complex 
level, it explains how ideas chase one another in the memory and where thought 
goes when it is finished with … It drums against the bookcase shelf and has to be 
held down with a brass weight. (Greenaway 1991: 24) 
 
Williams remembers this book as ‘an imagined conflation of the complex systems of 
oceanography, aerodynamics, meteorology, gravity and biology, that also traces the 
unpredictable trajectories of the dance of remembering and forgetting in the processes of 
thought’. He writes, 
The very notion of such a book excited me, drawing my attention to something of 
the infinite array of kinds of movement, phenomenal and ideational. It was a kind of 
wake-up call into the dynamic motilities within which we are always already 
swimming. (Williams 2011: 117) 
 
Maximizing perception of these dynamic motilities can be seen as a project of the somatic 
educator or practitioner, while dance improvisation performance can act as a translator and 
camera to these processes. Used consciously, in the case of dance artists, or unconsciously, in 
the case of Myers’ gesticulating scientists, improvisation holds potential as a rich source of 
engagement with an extended sensuous environment. 
Analysis through postphenomenological practices enables us to question the products of 
this engagement, asking how practicing improvisation scores shifts our understanding of the 
world. Improvisation artists and movement educators have a responsibility when working with 
imagery to acknowledge the schemas these improvisation technologies produce: body as camera, 
body as translator, body as cellular speech, body as book. Yet because the medium of dance is 
moving and not still, image translation made through the body brings a live three-dimensionality 
that is not possible through photography or video. Improvisation offers the potential for a body to 
consciously operate as a moving archive of perception. 
In their article ‘The corporeal body in virtual reality’ Judith Sixsmith and Craig Murray 
examine how engagement with virtual reality environments can bring about transformative 
experiences of the body’s sensory architecture. They draw on Marcel Mauss’s work (1992) to 
put forward the idea that ‘the body is our first and most natural technical object’, and propose 
that ‘techniques of the body work not only upon the body-object, but also upon the body-lived, 
producing our embodied experience’ (Sixsmith and Murray 1999: 319). Going further, Manning 
also posits the sensing, moving body as an extended system that alters the relational space–time 
matrices in which they move, generating new, rhizomatic and relational systems: 
Sensing bodies in movement are open systems that reach toward one another 
seemingly, becoming through these relational matrices. As these bodies individuate 
relationally, they evolve beyond their ontological status, becoming ontogenetic. 
Technogenesis is the dynamic becoming of the sensing body in movement.  
(2009: 66) 
 Perception-enhancing technologies extend the reach of the body and generate new models of 
relating. Improvisation-based technologies that encourage movers to take perception seriously 
and explore affinities for moving ‘like’ another thing can develop the usefulness of our ‘fleshy 
antennae’ and provoke questions of how far these sensory motilities can be tools for research 
and communication. Engaging with such technologies through performance has the potential to 
provoke further examination of the kinaesthetically and affectively charged knowledges 
produced by one body moving, with curiosity, in relation to another. 
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1. iPostphenomenology is proposed by Don Idhe as a contemporary approach to phenomenology that 
recognizes and questions the technological mechanisms that influence and condition our experience of 
the world (see Ihde’s Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context, 1993). 
 
                                                   
